

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
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USNATO BRUSSELS 556

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AMGT, BU, XH
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: A) CERP 0001; B) SOFIA A-5, JAN 31, 1977; C) STATE 8356;
D) STATE 47671; E) STATE 41169; F) STATE 38338

A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BULGARIA

THESE STEM PRIMARILY FROM THREE FACTORS: (A) BULGARIA'S
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ASTRIDE THE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT LAND
COMMUNICATIONS ROUTE CONNECTING EUROPE WITH ASIA; (B) ITS
POSITION BORDERING ON TWO HETERODOX COMMUNIST STATES, YUGO-
SLAVIA AND ROMANIA, AND ON TWO MEMBERS OF NATO, GREECE AND
TURKEY; AND (C) THE CONTRAST -- AND INTERPLAY-- BETWEEN THE
SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LOYAL, RELIABLE BULGARIA
AND ITS UNSTABLE AND EVOLVING RELATIONSHIPS WITH MOST OF ITS
OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES.

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PROCEEDING FROM S/P'S ASSUMPTION, WHICH I ACCEPT AS
PLAUSIBLE, THAT WE WILL FIND IT IN OUR INTEREST TO BROADEN
OUR RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND
THAT THIS MAY BE AFFECTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, I BELIEVE
IT ALSO SAFE TO ASSUME THAT BULGARIA WILL HANG BACKXEPND
OTHER EE COUNTRIES IN ANY LIBERALIZATION AND THAT IN ANY CASE
IT WILL NOT DESERVE ANY PRIORITY IN OUR ATTENTION. TO

SAY THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT NEGLECT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH BULGARIA WOULD SERVE OUR INTEREST.

AINST THIS BACKGROUND, I DEFINE U.S. INTERESTS IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO AS FOLLOWS:

-- CORRECT, REASONABLY CORDIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND ITS NATO NEIGHBORS, GREECE AND TURKEY;

-- BULGARIAN RESTRAIM VS-A-VIS YUGOSLAVIA, PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT OF TROUBLE IN THAT COUNTRY AFTER THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT TITO;

-- RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, INCLUDING THE US, THAT MAKE FOR GREATER OPENNESS IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND PERSONAL CONTACTS, TO DIMINISH THE PRESENT ALL BUT TOTAL RELIANCE UPON THE USSR WITHOUT, HOWEVER, GIVING RISE TO SOVIET FEARS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE REGIME;

-- CULTIVATION OF THE MODEST BUT STEADILY GROWING MARKET FOR AMERICAN EXPORTS;

-- A REGIME WHICH, WHILE COMMUNIST, DOES NOT DO VIOLENCE TO THE NATIONAL TRADITIONS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ITS PEOPLE, AND WHICH HAS SUFFICIENT CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED TO MAKE THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES (WITH ALL THAT THIS IMPLIES FOR THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, ROMANIA) UNNECESSARY.

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B. OVERVIEW

IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN PAST POLICY DOCUMENTS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO CHALLENGE DIRECTLY THE DOMINANT SOVIET ROLE IN BULGARIA; THAT IN FACT TACIT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW MAY ENABLE US TO GRADUALLY LOWER SOME OF THE EXISTING BARRIERS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND THE UNITED STATES; AND THAT, INDEED, "GRUDGING SOVIET TOLERATION OF ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE... RESULTS IN PART FROM THE SOVIET CONVICTION OF BULGARIA'S RELIABILITY."

I BELIEVE THIS CONTINUES TO HOLD TRUE, AND TO IT SHOULD BE ADDED THE OBSERVATION THAT BULGARIA'S SPHERE OF DIPLOMATIC AUTONOMY IS VERY SMALL AND THAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IT WILL CONTINUE TO ACT INTERNATIONALLY IN LOCKSTEP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRESENT BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT SEES THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW NOT ONLY AS THE SUREST PROP OF ITS CONTINUATION IN POWER (AS

IS TRUE ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE), BUT ALSO AS THE CONNECTION WHICH BEST GUARANTEES CONTINUED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY AGAINST IT NEIGHBORS.

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THE TODOR ZHIVKOV REGIME REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST ORTHODOX IN EASTERN EUROPE, MAINTAINING ITS PEOPLE IN GREATER ISOLATION FROM THE WEST THAN ANY EXCEPT ALBANIA. YET EVEN HERE, CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. EVEN BEFORE THE ACT OF HELSINKI, THE PROCESS OF DETENTE HAS ALLOWED WSZR NATIONS, INCLUDING THE US, TO MODESTLY INCREASE THEIR CULTURAL PRESENCE; THERE IS INCREASING TRAVEL OF BULGARIANS TO THE WEST FOR EDUCATIONAL AND BUSINESS PURPOSES, AND MORE WESTERN BUSINESSMEN, SCIENTISTS, ACADEMICS AND CULTURAL FIGURES ARE COMING TO BULGARIA; ALSO THERE IS GREATER (THOUGH STILL QIZ MODEST) IMPORTATION OF WESTERN FILMS, TELEVISION SHOWS, BOOKS, AND RECORDS. ALL THESE THINGS REMAIN VERY CLOSELY CONTROLLED BY PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, YET THE SPHERE OF WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE IS CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN WAS THE CASE ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO.

AN ADDITIONAL LEAVENING TO THE SYSTEM IS INTRODUCED BY THE ENTRY INTO THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE.
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TURE OF YOUNG PEOPLE, BETTER EDUCATED THAN THEIR SENIORS AND USUALLY MORE WIDELY TRAVELLED. MANY, PERHAPS MOST IN THIS GROUP, AFTER YEARS OF COMPULSORY COURSES IN DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERMINABLE KOMSOMOL LECTURING, SEE THEMSEVES AS PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNOCRATS AND CHARACTERISTICALLY HAVE LITTLE PATIENCE WITH THE CLAIMS OF IDEOLOGY. THIS YOUNGER GENERATION IS MORE OPEN TO WESTERN INFLUENCE THAN THEIR SENIORS.

THUS, IF CHANGE COMES TO BULGARIA ONLY VERY SLOWLY, THERE IS INDEED CHANGE IN THE DIRECTION OF MORE OPENNESS TO THE WES, AND I BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE INCREASING, THOUGH STILL RELATIVELY LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES TO ACCELERATE THAT TREND.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, AND ISSUES

I. OBJECTIVES: I SEE THE FOLLOWING AS BASIC U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT ONE OR TWO YEARS:

A. BREAK DOWN THE INSULARITY AND PROVINCIALISM OF BULGARIA'S LEADERSHIP AND SUB-ELITES SO THAT AT LEAST IN MATTERS THAT ARE NOT OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR, THEY WILL COME TO THINK MORE IN TERMS OF NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST, OR IN TERMS OF THE MERITS OF ISSUES, THAN BY REFLEX.

B. BROADEN U.S. ACCESS TO THE BULGARIAN LEADERSHIP AND SUB-ELITES, MAKING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. OVER A BROAD SPECTRUM SO VISIBLE THAT IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE PEOPLE AS A NORMAL FEATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WORLD OUTSIDE.

C. CONTINUED EXPANSION OF TRADE WITH BULGARIA AND INTRODUCTION OF A LARGER COMPONENT OF U.S. INDUSTRIAL GOODS INTO THAT TRADE.

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D. IMPROVED BULGARIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE ACT OF HELSINKI, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO A FREER FLOW OF INFORMATION, REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES, AND PROVISION OF ECONOMIC DATA.

E. CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND GARIAN SPECIALISTS IN SUPPRESSION OF NARCOTICS TRAFFIC.

F. SETTLEMENT OF U.S. BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS.

THESE POLICY OBJECTIVES ARE ODSICALLY THE SAME AS THOSE CONTAINED IN THE EMBASSY'S ANNUAL ASSESSMENT FOR 1976 (SOFIA 0482, MARCH 1976). I BELIEVE THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS WAS MADE TOWARD MSHX THOSE GOALS DURING 1976. NOTABLE HAVE BEEN ZHIVKOV'S PLEDGE TO SECRETARY BUTZ ON DIVIDED FAMILIES (WHICH ALSO ILLUSTRATES THE GOOD THAT CAN BE DONE BY HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO BULGARIA); THE STAGING OF THE FIRST U.S. CULTURAL EXHIBITION IN BULGARIA SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II; THE NEGOTIATION OF A CMPREYN-SIVE CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND PROGRAM DOCUMENT WHICH SHOULD GREATLY EXPAND INTERACTION IN THESE AREAS IN THE COMING YEARS; THE ARTISTIC TRIUMPH ENJOYED BY THE LOS ANGELES PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA; A MORE MUTED QUALITY TO GOB OPPOSITION IN THE UN ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE AN INCREASE OF ABOUT 40 PER CENT IN TWO-WAY TRADE; THE SIGNING OF A US-GOB FISHERIES AGREEMENT; AND SOMEWHAT MORE BULGARIAN RECEPTIVITY TO SOCIAL CONTACT WITH AMERICANS.

OBVIOUSLY MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. ZHIVKOV'S PLEDGE HAS BEEN INCOMPLETELY TRANSLATED INTO ACTION BY

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THE BULGARIAN BUREAUCRACY (BUT EVEN DESPITE SOME GLARING EXCEPTIONS -- SUCH AS THE MAREV CASE -- THE BULGARIANS HAVE GREATLY ACCELERATED THE REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES IN THE PAST YEAR), AND THE GOB RECORD ON OTHER BASKET II AND III ITEMS IS STILL BADLY DEFICIENT. MOST OF OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES ARE LONG-TERM AND WILL NEED PERSISTENT, PATIENT FOLLOW-THROUGH OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS.

II. COURSES OF ACTION

A. POLIPCAG

1. THOUGH WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT ALL IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WILL BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH (IN MANY CASES IMPOSED BY) THE SOVIET UNION, WE SHOULD DEAL WITH BULGARIA AS A FULLY SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OWN ACTIONS. ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS WHERE THERE IS SOME DEGREE OF "FIT" BETWEEN U.S. AND BULGARIAN INTERESTS (E.G. LAW OF THE SEA), PRESS FOR SECRET

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OVERT BULGARIAN COOPERATION. EVEN ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES (E.G. KOREA, TTPI), TAKE THE TROUBLE TO FULLY EXPLAIN THE U.S. POSITION TO RELEVANT GOB OFFICIALS. ENCOURAGE OUR NATO AND OECD PARTNERS TO DO THE SAME.

2. CONTINUE TO HOLD REGULAR DISCUSSIONS OF CSCE ISSUES WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE FOREIGN MINISTER, SELECTING FOR EMPHASIS THOSE ELEMENTS WHERE BULGARIAN COMPLIANCE IS MOST IN OUR LONG-RANGE INTEREST (SEE III B BELOW).

3. GI CONTINUING CONSIDERATION TO MAKING USE OF TRAVEL BY SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS (INCLUDING CABINET LEVEL) TO THIS AREA FOR MAKING BRIEF VISITS TO BULGARIA. AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE BUTZ VISIT IN 1976, SUCH VISITS CAN SIGNIFICANTLY ADVANCE OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES HERE.

4. MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE GOB TO EXPEDITE FAVORABLE PROCESSING OF DIVIDED FAMILY CASES AND, AS NECESSARY, MAKE HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIONS IN BOTH SOFIA AND WASHINGTON ON "DIFFICULT" CASES. BECAUSE DIFFICULTIES COMPOUND ONCE THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (WHICH HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSPORT AND EXIT VISA ISSUANCE) HAS MADE AN ADVERSE DECISION, SINCE THAT STATE SECURITY ORGAN TENDS TO OPERATE AS A LAW UNTO ITSELF, SEEK TO DEVISE A SYSTEM WHEREBY FUTURE CASES ARE DISCUSSED WITH THE MFA CONSULAR DEPARTMENT BEFORE ROUTINE PROCESSING BEGINS AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY.

5. OFFER THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON GREATER ACCESS TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS AT THE OFFICE DIRECTOR LEVEL (AND, WHERE JUSTIFIED, AT HIGHER LEVELS) FOR BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION OF U.S. POLICIES ON OTHER THAN PURELY BILATERAL MATTERS. SEEK TO EXPAND SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES FOR OFFICERS OF THE EMBASSY.

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6. BUILDING ON THE SLIGHT INCREASE IN INFORMAL ACCESS AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH BULGARIANS DURING 1976, PRESS FOR CONTINUED INCREASE IN CONTACT ON A BROADER BASIS.

B. ECONOMIC

1. CONTINUE TO PROMOTE EXPANSION OF TRADE THROUGH EMBASSY AND WASHINGTON ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN (INCLUDING BUSEC), TECHNICAL SALES SEMINARS, ANNUAL PARTICIPATION AT THE PLOVDIV INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIR, AND PERSONAL CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE BULGARIAN OFFICIALS.

2. UPGRADE THE EMBASSY COMMERCIAL REFERENCE LIBRARY THROUGH ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL BOOKS AND PERIODICALS AND PUBLICIZE THE FACILITIES IT HAS TO OFFER. UPGRADE ALSO THE PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EMBASSY'S FSLE COMMERCIAL ASSISTANT THROUGH FAMILIARIZATION VISITS TO OTHER EAST EUROPEAN POSTS AND TO THE EAST-WEST TRADE DEVELOPMENT OFFICE AT VIENNA.

3. CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE TO THE GOB THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF U.S. BONDHOLDERS' CLAIMS TO FURTHER NORMALIZATION OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

4. CONSIDER, AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME IN 1977, A VISIT FROM A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TO DISCUSS EXPANSION OF TRADE.

5. ATTEMPT TO EXPEDITE EXPORT CONTROL BOARD PROCESSING.

C. CULTURAL, INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC

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M SIGN, WITH APPROPRIATE PUBLICITY, THE CULTURAL,

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EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFC EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND PRO-
GRAM DOCUMENT NEGOTIATED IN 1976. THEREAFTER, PRESS
FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION.

2. FOLLOW THROUGH ON OUR INVITATION TO NACHO
PAPAZOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNICAL
PROGRESS AND HIGHER EDUCATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON TO
FORMALLY CONCLUDE (EITHER THE CULTURAL AGREEMENT OR) THE
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HIS COMMITTEE AND
THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION. IN THAT CONNECTION,
ARRANGE A SUITABLE PROGRAM OF DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS
FOR PAPAZOV IN THE U.S..

E. IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT TO NEW YORK OF
LYUDMILLA ZHIVKOVA (CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON ART
AND CULTURE) FOR THE OPENING OF THE THRACIAN ART EX-
HIBIT AT THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART IN JUNE 1977,
ARRANGE APPROPRIATE VISITS AND CALLS FOR HER AND SELECTED
MEMBERS OF HER ENTOURAGE IN WASHINGTON AND OTHER CENTERS.

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4. PLAN FOR A MA4 7.S. CULTURAL EXHIBITION IN BULGARIA IN 1978 UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ALREADY NEGOTIATED CULTURAL PROGRAM. ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE THE APPEARANCE IN SOFIA IN 1977 OF AT LEAST ONE OUTSTANDING AMERICAN PERFORMING GRP AND AT LEAST ONE SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN CULTURAL FIGURE.

5. ATTEMPT TO EXPAND PROGRAMMING OF STAGS AND VOLUNTARY VISITORS AND UTILIZE THEIR PRESENCE TO INCREASE EMBASSY INTERACTION WITH CULTURAL, ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ELITES AND SUB-ELITES.

6. DEVOTE MAJOR ATTENTION TO THE EMBASSY LIBRARY OUTREACH PROGRAM. IF THIS PROGRAM DOES NOT ACHIEVE INCREASED BOOK AND PERIODICAL USE, CONSIDER OTHER MEANS OF ACHIEVING INCREASED FAVLIARITY AND USE OF AMERICAN BOOKS AND PERIODICALS (E.G. BOOK DONATION TO UNIVERSITY OR OTHER LIBRARIES; PRESENTATION SUBSCRIPTIONS, ETC.).

7. FOLLOW UP ON THE VERBAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LIBRARY OF CMGRESS (WASHINGTON) AND THE LIBRARIAN OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY (SOFIA) THAT AMERICAN ACQUISITIONS WOULD BE PERIODICALLY DISPLAYED IN THE PUBLIC LIBRARY IN SOFIA AND THAT IN 1977 THE MOST IMPORTANT BULGARIAN ITEMS OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WOULD BE PUBLICLY DISPLAYED AT APPROXIMATELY THE TIME OF THE THRACIAN EXHIBIT.

8. CONTINUE PRESSING FOR INCREASED USE OF USIA-ORIGINATED MATERIALS BY BULGARIAN MEDIA. IN THIS CONNECTION,CITE WHAT IS BEING DONE ELSEWHERE (E.G. POLAND, HUNGARY, USSR).

D. OTHER

1. NEGOTIATE THE PURCHASE OF A NEW CHANCERY SITE.
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BEGIN ARCHITECTURAL AND OTHER PLANNING FOR CONSTRUCTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, PREPARE A FEASIBILITY AND COST ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTING STAFF APARTMENTS IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE NEW CHANCERY.

2. THROUGH NEGOTIATION WITH MFA'S BUREAU FOR SERVICE TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS,ATTEMPT TO UPGRADE EXISTING HOUSING AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY STAFF. ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE THROUGH OUTRIGHT PURCHASE MORE SUITABLE

QUARTERS FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION (WHOSE APARTMENT, IN ANY CASE, IS LIKELY TO BE WITHDRAWN BY THE BUREAU FOR SERVICE TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS BEFORE THE END OF 1977).

III. ISSUES

WHILE THESE ARE NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING "ISSUES", I SEE THREE AREAS IN WHICH MY PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH IN BULGARIA AND OF BULGARIA'S ROLE IN EASTERN EUROPE MAY DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT: (A) BULGARIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA; (B) WHERE WE SHOULD PUT OUR WEIGHT IN CONNECTION WITH CSCE AND IN GENERAL IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA; AND (C) THE OLD, AND PERHAPS DEAD OR DYING, ISSUE OF "SEQUENCING."

A. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA. I THINK WASHINGTON UNDERSTANDS VERY WELL THAT BULGARIA WILL DO WHAT THE USSR WANTS IT TO DO WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA. BUT WHAT MAY BE LESS WELL UNDERSTOOD IS THAT WHENEVER MOSCOW BELIEVES IT IN ITS OWN INTEREST TO LOOSEN THE REINS, THE BULGARIANS WOULD RESPOND BY MAKING TROUBLE FOR YUGOSLAVIA WITH ALACRITY AND GENUINE NATIONALISTIC ENTHUSIASM. STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA HAVE A LONG HISTORY. BULGARIA HAS FOUGHT THE SERBS FOUR TIMES IN LESS THAN A HUNDRED YEARS AND COUNTS THEM AMONG ITS HEREDITARY ENEMIES. BULGARIA HAS KEPT STILL UNDER YUGOSLAVIA'S SECRET

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CONTINUED NEEDLING ON THE MACEDONIAN ISSUE ONLY BECAUSE MOSCOW TOLD IT TO DO SO -- AND THIS IS AN ASPECT OF FOR-

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EIGN POLICY COORDINATION THAT IS GALLING TO MOST BULGARI-
ANS. THIS SMOLDERING RESENTMENT IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY
WE HAVE REPEATEDLY WARNED AGAINST RFE PICKING UP AND USING
CRITICAL YUGOSLAV COMMENTS IN BROADCASTS TO BULGARIA:
IT LESSENS RFE'S CREDIBILITY HERE AND OFFENDS BULGARIAN
LISTENERS WHOM WE MAY WANT TO REACH IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS PRIORITIES AND HELSINKI. THERE IS
NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT WE MUST ADHERE TO OUR MEASURED
DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE
WHEREVER THEY MAY BE. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO HOW THE US PER-
CEIVES ITSELF AS A SOCIETY AS WELL AS TO HOW IT IS PER-
CEIVED BY OTHERS. EVEN IN BULGARIA THE IMPACT OF THIS POSI-
TION HAS ALREADY BEEN FELT. HOWEVER, FROM THIS VANTAGE
POINT IT SEEMS THAT WHILE WE MUST FIRMLY REJECT AT BEL-
GRADE THE COMMUNIST CHARGE THAT SUCH DEFENSE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE FINAL ACT, MORE EMPHASIS
SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE
WEST AND TO RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM THERE, FOR THE FOLLOW-
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ING REASONS:

-- IF WE CAN MAKE SOCIETIES LIKE BULGARIA MORE
PERMEABLE TO INFORMATION AND IDEAS FROM THE WEST, WE
DIRECTLY ADVANCE THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN I A AND B OF
THIS MESSAGE, AND THUS IMPROVE WESTERN SECURITY.

-- WHAT WE KNOW OF THE BULGARIAN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY
SUGGESTS THAT THEY ARE LESS CONCERNED OVER THE RIGHT TO
EXPRESS FAR-REACHING DISSENTING OPINIONS THAN THEY ARE OVER
THE RIGHTS TO TRAVEL TO THE WEST, TO READ WESTERN NEWS-
PAPERS, TO SEE WESTERN TELEVISION PROGRAMS, IN SHORT TO
OBTAIN RELIEF FROM THE STIFLING CLOSENESS OF THE EAST AND
TO BECOME PART OF THE WORLD.

-- THE OBLIGATIONS IN BASKET III ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO
DENY, THEY ARE SO SPECIFIC AND DETAILED. INDEED THE BUL-
GARIAN COMMUNISTS DO NOT DENY THEM BUT TAKE REFUGE IN CLAIMS

THAT BULGARIA IS ALREADY IN FULL COMPLIANCE. ON THE OTHER QND, IN MY OPINION THE GRANTING OF CIVIL LIBERTIES TO THE DEGREE SOUGHT BY CHARTER 77 -- EVEN IN SOFIA, WHERE THE REGIME IS MORE FIRMLY INSTALLED THAN IN OTHER EE COUNTRIES -- WOULD PROBABLY SOUND THE DEATH KNEEL OF COMMUNISM.

-- EMPHASIS ON GENERAL PRINCIPLE NUMBER SEVEN, RATHER THAN ON THE DETAILED PROVISIONS OF BASKET III, INVOLVES US IN ARGUMENT OVER BASICS RATHER THAN SPECIFICS; AND EXPERIENCE IN NEGOTIATING WITH BULGARIA SHOWS THAT WE ARE MORE APT TO OBTAIN SOMETHING USEFUL WHEN TALKING ABOUT SPECIFICS THAN WHEN TALKING ABOUT BROAD PRINCIPLES.

-- THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT LENDS ITSELF MORE READILY TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS AND RELATIONS ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, WHICH ARE ALSO HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, THAN TO DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL REPRESSION BY THE SIGNATORY GOVERNMENTS. THIS IS A LESS IMPORTANT ARGUMENT IN MY OWN
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MIND, BUT IT MAY CARRY WEIGHT WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

-- AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE WITHOUT ALWAYS COMMUNICATING IT EFFECTIVELY, WE STILL NEED A "STRATEGY" IN BELGRADE, WHICH TO MY MIND MEANS THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A HIERARCHY OF PRIORITIES. IF WE EMPHASIZE EVERYTHING, WE EMPHASIZE NOTHING. BUT EVEN AMONG THE GOOD THEMES, WE SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT WE SELECT FOR EMPHASIS THE ONE OR TWO THAT BEST SERVE OUR INTERESTS.

IN STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF PUTTING THE WEIGHT OF OUR ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION SECTOR I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT ATTACK IS ENOUGH; ON THE CONTRARY, I HAVE LONG BELIEVED THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL FLEXIBLY AND IMAGINATIVELY, AND NOT IN A DOCTRINAIRE MANNER, WITH COMMUNIST DEMANDS FOR "RECIPROCITY".

C. SEQUENCING. I WOULD FAVOR SEQUENCING IF I THOUGHT THAT IT BROUGHT US RESULTS WE COULD NOT OTHERWISE ACHIEVE. I DO NOT SEE THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED, THOUGH I SUPPOSE IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE EAST GERMANS OR CZECHS MAY BE SHOCKED TO LEARN THEY COME AFTER BULGARIA IN THE US SCHEME OF THINGS, OR THAT THE HUNGARIANS MIGHT BE FLATTERED TO KNOW THEY RANK HIGHER. (I HAVE NEVER QUESTIONED THAT YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA AND POLAND NEED SPECIAL TREATMENT.) AS FAR AS BULGARIA IS CONCERNED, I THINK WE SHOULD DEAL WITH IT IN A THOROUGHLY HARD-NOSED MANNER, ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE GOB BEHAVIOR BY WITHHOLDING THINGS OR OFFERING THEM AS A LURE, NOT BY TRYING TO BE NICER TO SOMEONE ELSE IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WILL MAKE BULGARIA JEALOUS. SEQUENC-

ING MIGHT STILL MAKE SENSE IN CONNECTIM WITH MFN, BUT
IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE PRECISE ORDER COULD BE PREDETER-
MINED NOW. CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE A WAY OF CHANGING, AND
INSTEAD OF IMPOSING A SCHEME ON OTHERS WE COULD WIND UP
ONLY WITH RIGIDITIES THAT WE HAD IVOSED ON OURSELVES.

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